#RUBY ZIP CPGZ PROFESSIONAL#
Using the occassion that Industry's eyes are turned on Microsoft's brave decision to block VBA Macros, we, professional Security Researchers taking the utmost consideration on increasing World's technologies resielience against their misuse, want to add following insight into current Threat Actor TTPs: However, the inner 7zip installer EXE file is not MOTW-marked!
#RUBY ZIP CPGZ ISO#
When you review Properties of that ISO file, you'll see its marked with MOTW flag.
#RUBY ZIP CPGZ DOWNLOAD#
Having created ISO file, mimic a HTTP server using Python: PS> py -m rver 80Īnd then download the ISO file using your Browser.
Serve the file with Simple HTTP Server, download, open ISO, review MOTW Using PackMyPayload.py emplace the file into an ISO Joliet disk easily with a command: PS> py PackMyPayload.py 7z2107-圆4.exe 7z2107-圆4.isoģ. The ZoneId=3 plays the role of marking file tainted. That information is stored in NTFS ADS (Alternate Data Stream) named Zone.Identifier which looks as follows:
You'll see a message prompting to Unblock the file, because it originates from an untrusted zone.: Download a regular file using your BrowserĪfter downloading a file, right click on it and review its properties. Lets present how Mark of the Web flag looks like in practice: 1. Demo - How Threat Actors Evade MOTW and Smuggle Macros Moreover, Windows 8+ is able to open these formats automatically upon double-click, making them notorius infection carriers, possibly devaluing MOTW in its security measure role. Their research disclosed, that some container file formats - namely ISO, VHD/ VHDX - do not propagate MOTW taint flag onto inner files upon auto-mount or auto-extraction. These areas serve defense gap role and are commonly abused by threat actors since years by now. Outflank shed more light on MOTW, back in 2020 by indicating areas where MOTW flag is not uniformly propagated.
#RUBY ZIP CPGZ SOFTWARE#
That flag acts as a tainted label available for software clients (browsers, mail clients, file archivers, etc) to mark files originating from untrusted areas like The Internet. The implemented behavior is explained to work by differentating macro-enabled Office documents based on the MOTW ( Mark of the Web) flag. Arguably overdue, yet an important step dramatically affecting in a positive way typical Windows+Office installation setups. This is an incredible step towards hardening the baseline configuration of User's workstation and the client software installed within. On Feb, 7th Microsoft announced default configuration change to block VBA macros originating from Internet. Should they provide container file to their victims, a foundation for disabling VBA macros in Internet-originated Office documents might be bypassed. There're various motives on why adversaries don't want MOTW on their files: Protected View in Microsoft Office was always among them. They do that to get their payloads pass file content scanners, but more importantly to avoid having Mark-Of-The-Web flag on their files. It can serve purpose for a Proof-of-Concept presenting emerging risk of container file formats with embedded malware, as well as helper for professional Red Team Operators to sharpen their Initial Access maneuvers.Ĭurrently Threat Actors are known to smuggle their malware archived in various container file formats, to name a few: This tool takes a file or directory on input and embeds them into an output file acting as an archive/container.
PackMyPayload - Emerging Threat of Containerized Malware
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